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Risk-based  capital (RBC) is an important component of deposit insurance 
reform.  This paper provides an empirical analysis of the new 1992 RBC bank 
standards,  applying them to data on virtually all U.S. banks from 1982 to 
1989.  The data reveal strong associations between several measures of future 
bank performance (including bankruptcy) and the RBC relative risk weights. 
These associations suggest that the weights constitute a significant 
improvement over the old capital standards,  although there are several 
instances in which the weights for specific categories appear to be out of 
line with the performance results.  Tests of the informational value of 
passing or failing the new and old capital standards show that both have 
independent information,  but that the new RBC standards better predict future 
bank performance problems.  The data also indicate that, in constrast to the 
old standards,  the RBC capital burden falls much more heavily on large banks. 
As a result,  banks representing more than one-fourth  of all bank assets would 
have failed the new RBC standards as of 1989.  The new standards are also more 
stringent overall. More banks would have failed the new standards than the old 
ones,  with larger average capital deficiencies. 
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The lessening of bank regulations in the early 1980s, the dramatic increase in 
depository institution failures in the middle and late 1980s, and the passage of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of  1989 (FIRREA) have heightened 
interest in depository institution insolvency risk and in the policy means to control this risk. 
One regulatory reform that preceded FlRREA was the international risk-based capital accord, 
which was adopted by bank regulatory agencies from 12 industrialized nations in 1988. The 
guidelines mandate that U.S. banks be in full compliance by December 1992. Similar 
guidelines are currently being implemented for U.S. thrift institutions. 
Risk-based capital (RBC) replaces capital guidelines that have required U.S. banks to 
hold a flat minimum percentage of capital against all assets since 1981. The risk-based stan- 
dards, in contrast, require that different minimum capital percentages be held against different 
categories of assets according to their perceived risks.  The new standards also require for the 
fit  time that capital be held against off-balance sheet activities. Another change is that the 
standards are largely uniform across all banks that operate internationally within the 12 par- 
ticipating nations. 
RBC should be viewed not in isolation, but as part of an overall reform of the deposit 
insurance system, the primary goal of which is to reduce the incentives to undertake exces- 
sive risks that are inherent in the current flat-rate insurance regime.  As will be shown below, 
RBC is a potential substitute for or complement to the risk discipline imposed by risk-based 
deposit insurance (RBDI) premia.  In addition, the ability of RBC standards to reduce risk 
taking is related to the choice of accounting system (market value versus book value of 
capital), and can help to determine the effectiveness  of bank examinations and policies to 
resolve problem institutions. 
As with any capital standard, RBC is a form of coinsurance designed to reduce the 
costs of insolvency risk imposed on the federal deposit insurer by requiring a "buffer" of 
uninsured private funds to absorb portfolio losses. The major innovation of RBC is the re- 
quirement that more capital be held against portfolio items with higher perceived risk in order 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmto provide incentives for banks to choose lower portfolio risk. This may be seen as implicit 
pricing of risk, since capital is a relatively costly source of funds, particularly when compared 
to insured deposits. 
In large part, the success of RBC  depends upon the extent to which the relative risk 
weights assigned to different portfolio categories correspond with the actual risks involved. 
If the correspondence is relatively tight, then the combination of the "buffer" value of the in- 
crease in capital and the incentives provided by the implicit pricing of portfolio risk is likely 
to be successful in reducing insolvency risk.  However, if the correspondence between the 
risk weights and actual risks is relatively loose, or if there are siWcant  areas in which 
higher risk categories receive lower risk weights, then some banks may have compelling in- 
centives to increase portfolio risk, thereby possibly raising their insolvency risk. 
To date, there has been little empirical analysis addressing this question of how the risk 
weights correspond to actual bank risk or examining the major features of RBC  in order to deter- 
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mine their likely effects.  This paper attempts to fill  these gaps.  We regress historical 
measures of bank performance, such as portfolio losses and bank failures, on the items in the 
RBC  risk categories and test the appropriateness of the relative weights assigned. We also com- 
pare the ability of various measures of capital, including both the new and the old capital 
standards, to predict future bank performance.  In addition, we examine the stringency of the 
new standards to determine whether they are likely to be effective in changing bank behavior. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections I1 and III put the paper in perspective by 
reviewing the extant literature on capital standards and by comparing the relative advantages 
of RBC  and RBDI,  respectively. Section IV  provides the empirical analysis in which 
measures of bank performance are regressed against RBC  risk categories and subcategories in 
order to examine the efficacy of the RBC  risk weights.  Section V examines the stringency of 
the RBC  standards by applying the 1992  standards to banks as of December 1989. The 
1. An exception is the contemporaneous work  by Bradley, Wambeke, and Whidbee (1990), which examines RBC 
standards  for thrifts. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmeffects of changing the standards in various ways and the results of likely changes in bank 
portfolios are also calculated. Section VI concludes. 
11.  Literature Review 
The extant literature on bank capital standards has 1) detailed their development and 
current specifications (e.g., Alfriend, 1988; Wall, 1989a), 2) analyzed their stringency and 
whether they were binding (e.g., Keeley, 1988; Keeton, 1989; Wall and Peterson, 1987), 3) 
examined the relative competitive effects of RBC across countries (e.g., Cooper, Kolari, and 
Wagster, 1990), 4) examined the extent to which one type of required capital, subordinated 
debt, imposes market discipline on banks (e.g., Avery, Belton, and Goldberg, 1988; Gorton 
and Santomero, 1990; Wall, 1989b), 5) examined how RBC might affect the supply of bank 
services (e.g., Haley, 1989), 6) examined how RBC  might substitute for risk-based deposit 
insurance (e.g., Avery and Belton, 1987; Flannery, 1990; Ronn and Verma, 1988,1986), and 
7) derived on a theoretical basis the circumstances under which capital requirements may in- 
crease or decrease bank portfolio or insolvency risk (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988; Koehn ' 
. 
and Santomero, 1980; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Keeton, 1988). 
The most important question corning out of this literature is that of item (7)--whether 
increased capital standards increase or decrease bank risk.  Virtually all authors agree that a 
mandatory increase in capital has the direct effect of reducing insolvency risk by providing an 
increased "buffer stock of reserve funds  to absorb losses. However, portfolio changes may 
also be induced, creating indirect effects on insolvency risk.  Most authors also agree that 
when capital is below some sufficiently low level (perhaps negative), this indirect effect will 
also reduce insolvency risk, as the mandatory capital increase induces a reduction in portfolio 
risk by mitigating the moral hazard incentives to undertake excessive risk.  However, authors 
sharply disagree upon whether banks in typical financial conditions will generally increase or 
decrease portfolio and insolvency risks as a result of increased capital requirements. 
Kim and Santomero (1988) and Koehn and Santomero (1980), using a mean-variance 
utility maximization model, showed that an increase in flat-rate capital requirements restricts 
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result of increased capital standards as they maximize utility along a restricted risk-return 
frontier. This occurs because banks may choose to take part of their reduction in utility from 
the loss in leverage as increased risk as well as lower expected return.  It is even possible that 
insolvency risk may increase as a result of an increase in capital standards, defeating the pur- 
pose of the increase. 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) followed a different ap- 
proach, examining the case of a bank with publicly traded stock that maximizes the value of 
that stock. They found that such a bank will never increase portfolio risk, ceteris paribus, as a 
result of increased capital standards. This stands in direct contrast to the results of the mean- 
variance utility maximization model.  A key feature of the Furlong and Keeley analysis is that 
under flat-rate deposit insurance, an increase in capital makes the bank take into account more 
of its prospective portfolio losses. In more technical tenns, the capital increase reduces the 
value of the deposit insurance put option, the value of the bank's option to put part of its 
portfolio to the insurer in the event of failure and have the insurer repay its insured depositors 
in full. Furlong and Keeley objected to the mean-variance model because it assumed away the 
possibility of bank failure and changes in the value of the put option.  However, Keeton (1988) 
showed that an increase in portfolio risk is quite possible as a result of increased capital stan- 
dards, using a more general utility maximization model that includes the put option value.  His 
analysis does not address the more important policy question of whether this increase in 
portfolio risk can be sufficient to offset the effect of increased capital in reducing bank insol- 
vency risk.  To our knowledge, no theory or example that includes the influence of the deposit 
insurance put option has yet been offered showing conditions under which increased capital 
requirements will result in increased bank insolvency risk. 
Although the theoretical debate is ongoing, little has emerged from this literature to sug- 
gest that widespread increases in insolvency risk will occur as a result of increases in capital 
requirements.  Insolvency risk increases do not occur in the stock value maximization model, 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand no studies have shown that such increases can occur in a utility maximization model that 
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incorporates the put option value. 
m. 
Over the past several years, RBC and RBDI have been among the most prominently dis- 
cussed methods of controlling bank risk, largely because they provide incentives for banks to 
reduce risk, rather than requiring direct intervention on the part of the insurer. Theoretically, 
either policy can reduce insolvency risk to virtually any level by placing sufficiently stiff 
penalties on risk through mandated increases in capital or insurance premia.  Thus, as is well 
known, the same level of insolvency risk can be achieved by  a well-implemented version of 
either policy (see Hannery, 1990; Ronn and Vem,  1988; Avery and Belton, 1987; Sharpe, 
1978). Despite this equivalence, a number of important differences exist between RBC and 
RBDI, especially when problems arise in setting the correct prices for either. We fmt examine 
the relative advantages of these policies when there are no pricing dficulties,  and then discuss 
how these advantages change when somehportant pricing problems are introduced. 
We assume throughout that the costs of raising capital are positively but imperfectly 
related to a bank's  insolvency risk.  For banks with traded stock, the imperfect relationship 
arises because of differential transactions costs in underwriting new issues, the loss of the 
deposit insurance subsidy, and, under the capital asset pricing model, the fact that the market 
only prices the part of risk that is correlated with the market portfolio.  For small banks that 
do not trade, additional wedges in the relationship between risk and the cost of  capital are 
created by problems such as a lack of diversification (which may induce considerable risk 
aversion), wealth constraints, and possible dilution of ownership and control. 
2. 'Ibe stock value maximization model may conform  best to larger banks, which are usually publicly traded, aad the 
utility maximization model may conform best to smaller, closely held banks.  However, to the extent that there are 
significant agency problems between stockholders and managers, the  utility maximization model may apply to both types 
of baoks, as managers are risk averse with  respect to their  employment. 
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their portfolio risks and capital positions, and pay for the marginal social costs of the result- 
ing insolvency risks.  These social costs include not only the value of the deposit insurance 
put option, but also any other social costs arising from bank risk internalized by the insurer, 
such as expected costs of liquidating failed banks, additional monitoring, and increased poten- 
tial for financial instability.  In the resulting equilibrium, banks with relatively high costs of 
capital or relatively good risky investment opportunities (i.e., a comparative advantage in 
high expected returnlhigh risk portfolios), ceteris paribus, would tend to have higher insol- 
vency risk and pay for this higher risk through greater insurance prernia.  To some degree, 
RBDI corrects the capital market's imperfect pricing of risk by allowing banks to trade off 
portfolio risk and capital at the socially appropriate relative price. 
RBDI pricing can also incorporate social costs other than those created by bank insol- 
vency risk.  For instance, Flannery (1990) argued that high capital ratios resulting from either 
RBDI or RBC may reduce the intermediation of bank deposits into bank assets, which in turn 
may reduce some positive externalities from the intermediation process.  In this event, op- 
timal RBDI pricing would determine the optimal mix between insolvency risk and 
intermediation by  setting a premium schedule that penalizes insolvency risk from high 
portfolio risk more than insolvency risk fiom low capital. 
A pure RBC regime with flat-rate deposit insurance would have fewer degrees of 
freedom than pure RBDI to achieve a social optimum.  Under RBC, banks are allowed to 
choose their portfolio risks directly, but not their capital positions or insolvency risks. 
Instead of explicitly pricing the social costs of insolvency risk, RBC implicitly prices 
portfolio risk by  setting minimum capital requirements such that if the minimum is held, the 
marginal social costs of insolvency risk for each bank equal the flat-rate deposit insurance 
premium.  Like pure RBDI, pure RBC can incorporate social costs other than those created 
by bank insolvency risk, including the loss of positive externalities fiom intermediation when 
capital is increased. 
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risks, dominates pure RBC, which implicitly prices only portfolio risks.  RBC creates a poten- 
tial efficiency loss relative to RBDI, since the banks with the best risky portfolio 
opportunities and those with the lowest cost of capital may not be able to exploit their com- 
parative advantages as well under RBC.  This is because under pure RBDI a bank can trade 
off its portfolio risk and its capital position at the socially appropriate relative price, which is 
incorporated in the insurance premium schedule. In contrast, under pure RBC, banks must 
trade off between portfolio risk and capital at the relative price available to the bank in the 
market.  This price may differ from the social optimum because of capital market imperfec- 
tions, or because it does not incorporate the external social costs of risk or other factors. 
Another problem with RBC is that some banks may choose to hold more than the minimum 
required capital, so that the implicit pricing of risk through capital requirements has no effect 
on the marginal decisions of these banks.  Thus, pure RBC can be as effective as pure RBDI 
in achieving a social optimum only if 1) the imperfections in the relationship between the cost 
of capital and bank risk are negligible, 2) the externalities from bank risk are negligible, and 
3) no banks choose to hold capital in excess of the minimum requirements. Conditions (1) 
and (2) ensure that the bank can trade off portfolio risk and capital at the socially appropriate 
rate in the market, and condition (3) ensures that RBC can affect their marginal tradeoff at 
all.3 
Thus, when there are no difficulties  in setting RBDI or RBC prices, pure RBDI with no 
capital requirements dominates RBC in the sense that RBDI can price any risk or other social 
cost at least as efficiently as RBC or any combination of RBDI and RBC.  However, as 
shown below, a role for RBC appears as soon as pricing problems are introduced. We con- 
sider two such problems here: asymmetric infomation and policy inflexibility. 
3. Note that we specifically de  out RBC schemes in which required capital is not monotonically inneasing in the 
social costs of insolvency risk.  This eliminates the  possibility of "death penalties," such as ocau  if requid 
capital is 100 percent unless portfolio risk is set at  the the socially optimal level. 
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We fmt relax the assumption of symmetric information.  The insurer is generally at a 
signifcant information disadvantage relative to a bank in regard to its portfolio risk, since a  ' 
principal reason for the existence of banks is to garner private information about the risk of 
its borrowers (see Diamond, 1984; Leland and Pyle, 1977). Bank examiners check the paper- 
work on only a sample of the assets and off-balance sheet contracts in the portfolio (see 
Udell, 1989), and even for these items, banks still may know their contractual counterparties 
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and their own portfolio risk significantly better than the insurer does. 
Asymmetric information opens the possibility for a productive role for RBC as a sub- 
stitute for or complement to RBDI for several reasons.  First, capital requirements may be 
viewed as a form of forced coinsurance. When a bank experiences portfolio losses, the 
owners bear the first tranche of losses, while the insurer bears part of one of the following 
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tranches.  To the extent that bank owners have better information on risk than does the in- 
surer, capital standards improve the informational efficiency of (implicit) risk pricing, as the 
shadow price of risk provided by capital tends to give more accurate signals to reduce risk. 
A second, related reason why RBC may be productive is that asymmetric information 
may exacerbate a moral hazard problem because the insurer cannot price any risk that it does 
not observe. By raising capital ratios for the least capitalized banks (which tend to have the 
greatest such moral hazard incentives), RBC may mitigate the problem by reducing the in- 
surer's share of the cost of the bank's risk.' 
4. It is assumed here that tbe only impomt informational asymmetry is between a bank and  the  insurer.  If  tbere 
are also important asymmetries between tbe bank ad  capital mar)ret participants, tben an advaotage of RBDI over RBC 
is that it allows tbe  bank to signal its risk assessment to tbe market using its leverage ratio (see Campbell and 
Kracaw, 1980; Leland and  Pyle, 1977). 
5. Some have argued that tbere is also substantial irdepeodent uncertainty about tbe  value of capital as well as 
about tbe  value of  tbe  portfolio (e.g.,  Fhnnery, 1990), although these two values are obviously closely related. 
6. 'Ibe exact tranche of losses borne by tbe immr  depends upon state depositor preference laws, tbe implementation 
of bridge bank legislation, and tbe closure and  purchase and assumption policies of tbe insurer. 
7.  Note that  while RBC results in higber capital than  RBDI for the  least capitalized banks, eitber policy may result 
in more capital for tbe  banking system as a whole.  This follows from the fact that RBDI may reward banks for acty 
increases in capital, while RBC does not reward capital increases above tbe minimum standards. 
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surer to gain more information about portfolio risk.  For any given portfolio risk, the bank 
will take longer to fail if  capital is higher.  During this time, the fluctuations in capital from 
observed portfolio gains and losses or the results of on-site examinations may reveal informa- 
tion that allows the insurer to improve its estimate of portfolio risk and change the explicit or 
implicit price charged for risk.  Under pure RBDI, a bank with very low capital may fail 
before much valuable information from this ex post monitoring is gamered. 
Finally, asymmetric information provides a reason why RBC may complement RBDI. 
Flannery (1990) showed that when portfolio risk is imperfectly observed, there is error in es- 
timating the put option value to use in pricing RBDI, and this error is decreasing in the capital 
ratio of the bank.  RBC increases capital for the least capitalized banks with the most severe 
rnispricing problems, which may reduce RBDI pricing errors and result in a better distribu- 
tion of insurance prernia and incentives. 
We next relax the assumption that the insurer is completely flexible in responding to 
changes in bank insolvency risk. At best, RBDI premia and RBC requirements are set with a 
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lag determined by  reporting or examination intervals.  In addition, government agencies 
often must follow strict rules that attach certain premia or capital requirements to objective 
reported criteria, such as balance sheet or income statement ratios, rather than using all the 
information learned through examination or market prices.  These inflexibilities lend some 
relative advantages to both RBDI and RBC. 
In tern  of explicit flexibility, RBDI has an advantage over RBC in that it has a shorter 
implementation lag.  Banks  can usually be made to pay a revised premium very quickly, 
whereas it may take considerable time to get new capital underwritten and sold to meet in- 
creased capital requirements. The difference is related to 1) the long and diEcult  process of 
8. Sagari and Udell(1990)  proposed reducing tbe effect of examination lags by letting banks &tennine  their own 
RBDI  premia and tben checking on  tbe accufacy of these p~mia  through retrospective examinations. Ex post penalties 
are imposed when tbe premia were too low for a previous period.  'Ibis procedure could apply as well to RBC. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmraising new capital and 2) the fact that the sheer number of dollars that must be raised for an 
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increase in RBC capital is much greater than the corresponding RBDI premium increase. 
In terms of implicit flexibility, by  contrast, RBC may have an important advantage over 
RBDI for the least capitalized banks.  Although the insurer may be bound by rules that do not 
allow responses to some publicly available information, market participants are not.  An in- 
crease in insolvency risk that is publicly known will result in some market discipline through 
higher costs for raising equity capital and uninsured debt.  The greater is the amount of these 
uninsured funding sources, the greater is the market discipline that automatically penalizes 
banks for increasing insolvency risk.  RBC has more implicit flexibility than RBDI in pricing 
risk for banks with very low capital, since RBC requires these banks to hold more capital, and 
the market pricing of this capital will reflect observed risk without the necessity of rules. 
Although new equity capital is issued only infrequently, an equity standard implicitly prices 
risk continuously to the extent that the equity holders have control over management. 
The analysis presented here suggests that pure RBDI is superior to pure RBC in terms 
of allocative efficiency when there are no information or policy implementation problems that 
create pricing errors. However, the best policy when these problems do occur may be neither 
pure RBDI nor pure RBC, but a combination of the two. 
W.  Empirical Analvsis of the Risk-Based Capital Standards 
The new RBC standards represent a significant  change from past capital guidelines. 
Under the old standards effective since 1981, all  banks were subject to the same minimum 
capital/asset ratios, irrespective of risk.  Primary capital (equity, loan loss reserves, and some 
convertible debt and preferred stock) had to be at least 5.5 percent of total balance sheet assets, 
and total capital (primary capital plus subordinated debt and the remaining preferred stock) 
had to be at least 6 percent of assets. Under the new standards, by contrast, required capital 
ratios depend upon the perceived risk of the various assets and off-balance sheet activities. 
9. See ROM  and Verma (1986,1988) and Avery and Belton (1987) for comparisons of the sizes of required premia under 
RBDI and required capital under RBC. 
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deposit insurance premia. The method followed by the FDIC in its 1985 RBDI proposal (see 
Hirschhom, 1986) focused on measures of current bank portfolio performance, such as em- 
ings and asset quality. The new RBC standards, in contrast, focus on the current types of 
10 
activities in bank portfolios.  This approach is based on the view that some activities are 
inherently more risky than others and therefore should be capitalized at higher levels.  Under 
the new standards, on-balance sheet assets a~ allotted to one of four categories (A1 - A4) and 
each category is assigned a different relative risk weight, ranging from 0 to 100  percent (as 
shown in Table 1). Off-balance sheet activities also have a number of separate treatments. 
We weight them using the RBC relative weights and group them under two categories-- 
counterparty guarantees (B I), where the bank guarantees the creditworthiness of another 
party (e.g., commitments, letters of credit), and market risk contracts (B2), where risk is 
principally determined by changes in market prices (e.g., interest rate swaps). The minimum 
capital level, K, required under the standards is then defined as: 
where a  is .04 for Tier 1 capital and .08 for total Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital, and B 1 and B2 
incorporate the weights of their components. Tier 2 capital is restricted to be no larger than 
Tier 1 capital, which implies that all banks that fail the Tier 1 standard also fail the total stan- 
dard (but not vice versa).  A feature of the old capital standards is retained in a leverage 
requirement that Tier 1 capital must be at least 3 percent of (unweighted) on-balance sheet 
assets, although the actual requirement will be higher for some banks.' ' 
10.  One exception is the new treatment of loan loss reserves as qualifying capital (see section V). 
1  1. At  the time of this writing, the  Wed  Reserve and OCC  have recently implemented similar leverage policies that 
mandate minimum 3 percent Tier 1 capital to unweighted assets ratios for banks with the  best examination rating 
(composite CAMEL  = 1) that meet certain otber conditions, with at least 1 to 2 percent additional capital for all 
otber banks.  The  FDIC  appears likely to implement a similar policy of 3 percent minimum for banks with the  best 
rating that meet otber conditions, with at least a 4 percent minimum for otber banks. 
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weighting of real estate loans at 50 percent rather than 100  percent) and may not necessarily 
reflect the true risks inherent in these different activities.  In addition, the risk categories are 
very broad and may include items with quite different risks, particularly the 100 percent asset 
category which groups commercial loans of all  qualities together.  Moreover, the covariances 
among risks are not directly included, so in some circumstances, speculative portfolios may 
have the same capital requirements as hedged ones. 
Despite these criticisms, however, if the higher weighted assets tend to have higher risk 
and if the off-balance sheet activities included create substantial risk, then the risk weights 
likely go significantly  beyond the old flat-rate standards in identifying bank risk.  It is also 
possible that even if the individual portfolio items do not cause risks in proportion to their 
risk weights, they are correlated with risks reasonably well in proportion to their weights. 
This would occur, for example, if banks with high percentages of Treasury securities or other 
zero-weight (Al) assets tend to have relatively low risk in their commercial loan portfolios or 
in their other full-weight (A4) assets. 
It is clear that the efficacy of the risk weights is an empirical question, although to date 
there has been very little empirical analysis attempting to relate the RBC risk weights to ac- 
tual bank risk. In this section, we examine this issue through the use of historical data on 
bank performance. We focus on the question of whether those assets assigned lower risk 
weights are associated with relatively "better" historical bank performance than those with 
higher weights. We also examine how failure to meet the RBC standards compares with 
failure to meet the old standards in predicting poor bank performance; that is, do the new 
standards truly take better account of risk differences across banks? 
The ideal data set for this analysis would include information on the performance of 
individual loans, off-balance sheet contracts, and other portfolio items. Unfortunately, a com- 
prehensive data set of this type is not available.  As the best feasible alternative, we analyze 
the problem at the individual bank level, making a number of comparisons. Measures of the 
current performance of a bank--the rate of nonperforming loans (past due and nonaccruing), 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe net loan charge-off rate, the earnings rate (in level and standard deviation), and failure 
(bankruptcy)--are regressed against the lagged shares of bank assets and off-balance sheet 
items in each risk weight class. These regressions are designed to determine whether the 
weighting of assets under the new standards is consistent with the bank performance that is 
historically associated with these assets. We also run  regressions to determine how failures to 
meet the new and old capital standards are associated with future bank performance. 
Because the choice among bank performance measures is somewhat arbitrary, we in- 
clude five different measures.  Bank failure is the ultimate determinant of performance and is 
arguably the most appropriate measure to use in testing capital standards. Only in the event 
of bank failure does the insurer take a loss and are significant social costs generated. 
Moreover, some types of risk cannot be measured directly (e.g., propensity for fraud), but 
these are at least captured somewhat by the probability of failure.  Each of the other measures 
captures one aspect of bank performance.  Nonperforming loans is a stock measure reflecting 
the cumulative additions of poor loans.  Charge-offs and earnings levels are flow measures, 
which may be more indicative of a bank's current performance. Earnings variability 
(standard deviation) reflects a longer-run view.  While these are not exhaustive measures of 
performance, they should provide a reasonably broad-based test of the issues cited above. 
Our analysis is based on Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) data measured 
annually on December 3  1 for the period 1982 to 1989. We divide banks into two different 
samples for the analysis. The "small bank" sample consists of those with total adjusted assets 
(gross assets plus loan loss reserves) of less than $250 million (in 1989 dollars) during the 
entire sample period.  Any period in which the bank had real adjusted assets of less than $10 
million was eliminated, as were any periods in which primary capital was more than one-half 
12 
of total assets.  The "large bank" sample consists of banks with real adjusted assets of more 
than $250 million in at least one year.  Together, the samples include data on virtually all 
12. Very small banks and very highly capitalized banks often operate as  specializing or shell banks that are atypical 
of bank behavior and  therefore were excluded. In terms of total idustry assets, these exclusions are trivial. 
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sion to split the sample stemmed fiom strong historical evidence that risk and performance 
differ substantially across bank size classes. 
The definition and sample means of the variables used are presented in Table 2.  Each 
variable is scaled to ratio form by dividing by total adjusted bank assets. The INCOME, 
NONPERFORM, and CHARGEOFF performance variables are measured for each period 
fiom  December 1983 through December 1989. If  a bank failed in the year preceding a 
measurement date, it is excluded from the NONPERFORM and CHARGEOFF regressions. 
INCOME, however, is estimated in these cases and is the negative of existing capital at the 
end of the previous year minus the FDIC's estimated net outlay for the bank (taken from 
13 
FDIC press releases).  FAILURE, which reflects failure of the bank within two years of a 
given date, is measured with starting points of December 1982 to December 1988.'  The 
independent variables-the  risk categories and subcategories, dummies for failing the new and 
old standards, and time period dummies for each year--are measured from December 1982 
through December 1988, a one year lag fiom the INCOME, NONPERFORM, and 
CHARGEOFF performance variables and an average lag of one year from the failures in the 
FAILURE performance variable. Because of the lag structure, the regressions using these 
variables will reflect the association between the independent variables and future bank per- 
formance. The time period dummies are included to control for systemwide changes in bank 
performance due to macroeconomic factors, changes in bank regulation, etc. 
The regressions that use the standard deviation of earnings, INCOMESTD, are purely 
cross-sectional. The standard deviation is measured over all periods during which the bank 
was in existence and this variable is regressed against the average levels of each of the inde- 
pendent variables measured over the same interval. 
13. This procedure avoids a potentially serious sample selection problem that might be  created if income were ex- 
cluded for failing banks (although this problem may still hold for the NONPERFORM  and CHARGEOFF  regressions). 
14. The last observation is slightly truncated and includes failures only through March 1990. 
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Overall, these procedures produced small and large bank sample sizes of 82,23  1 and 
9,675 bank-years for the income and bank failure regressions; 8 1,457 small and 9,597 large 
bank-years for the nonperforming loan and charge-off regressions; and 13,169 small and 
1,528 large bank cross-sectional observations for the income variability models. 
Table 3 displays the regressions used to examine the appropriateness of the risk 
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weights specified by the RBC standards.  Two regressions are displayed for each dependent 
variable in each sample. The first regression includes variables representing the quantities in 
each risk category weighted by their risk weight: RWA20, RWMO, RWA100, COUNTER, 
and MKTRISK. The zero percent risk category is excluded as a base case, since it would 
have a weighted quantity of zero, and will be discussed further below.  We also include vari- 
ables for several risk subcategories weighted by their risk weights: REALEST, C&I, 
CONSUMER, and COMMIT.  The purpose of the latter variables is to test some of the more 
controversial aspects of the risk weights.  The second regression includes the ratio of total 
risk-weighted assets to unweighted assets, RWA, as a single aggregate RBC measure.  Both 
regressions include the time dummies. 
These regressions test the appropriateness of the risk weights as follows. In all but the 
INCOME regressions, positive coefficients are expected for the risk categories if they are 
indeed associated with "poorer" bank performance.  Moreover, if the RBC weights are ap- 
propriate in predicting performance, each of the coefficients of RWA20, RWMO, RWA100, 
COUNTER, and MKTRISK should be of the correct sign and equal. This equality is implied 
by the fact that the RBC weighting is already incorporated in the independent variables. In 
addition, if the RBC weights are correct, then the coefficients of the four risk subcategories, 
REALEST, C&I, CONSUMER, and COMMIT, should be zero, since these quantities are al- 
ready included with appropriate restrictions in the broader risk categories. The regression with 
15. The regressions were estimated by  OLS, but the standard emrs were corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation among tbe multiple emr  terms for an individual bank.  Essentially, the  procedure estimates a separate 
distribution for each bank using tbe exogenous variables and OLS residuals. This reduced the  repotted t-statistics 
considerably in mast cases. 
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able incorporates all the equality and zero restrictions on the risk categories and subcategories. 
Thus, if the risk weights are correct, the coefficients of RWA20, RWASO, RWA100, 
COUNTER, and MKTRISK should not be significantly different from the coefficient on RWA 
shown below, and fit of the two regressions should not be significantly different. 
A comparison of the coefficients in the two regressions can also suggest which par- 
ticular weights are inappropriate, and by how much.  A risk category in the first regression 
with a coefficient of the same sign and higher absolute value as that of RWA in the second 
regression has more effect on performance than is indicated by its risk weight and may have 
been weighted too lightly. Similarly, a risk variable with lower absolute value or opposite- 
sign coefficient to that of RWA likely has been weighted too heavily. 
In general, the results suggest that the RBC variables have the correct signs predicting 
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performance and that the risk weights have the correct relative ordering.  In the regressions 
using the RWA variable (the ratio of risk-weighted assets to unweighted assets), the coefficient 
consistently indicated poorer performance (negative coefficient for INCOME, positive coeffi- 
cient for INCOMESTD, NONPERFORM, CHARGEOFF, and FAILURE) in all 10 cases and 
was statistically significant  at the 5 percent level in 8 of the 10 cases. This strongly suggests 
that the RBC relative risk weights are an improvement over the equal weights of the old stan- 
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dards.  Specific findings of interest on the individual risk categories and subcategories from 
the more detailed regressions may be summarized as follows. 
First, the controversial policy moving residential mortgage loans from the 100  percent 
risk category to the 50 percent category appears to be supported by the data.  With the excep- 
tion of the nonperforming loan regressions, the total coefficient of residential real estate loans 
16. It should be noted that  the overall fits of the  regressions are relatively poor.  This is caused in part by  the 
decision to include only the  variables reflecting the RBC  standards.  Many other variables that have been shown to 
predict future bank performance, such  as asset and liability composition variables, were deliberately excluded. 
This is appropriate in performing tests of the RBC  standards, since the standards contain no provisions to account 
for these other variables. 
17. Note, however, that a joint test of all the exact restrictions on tbe individual risk categories and subcate- 
gories is rejected in all 10 cases. 
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weighted less heavily rather than more heavily.  Indeed, by even wider margins, other assets 
in the 50 percent category standards (primarily municipal bonds) appear to be weighted too 
heavily as well.  Second, evidence that we report elsewhere (Avery and Berger, 1988,1991) 
showing that loan commitments are associated with better rather than poorer bank perform- 
ance is supported by all 10 regressions in which COMMIT appears. In both samples, in- 
creased proportions of loan commitments (reflected by the sum of the coefficients of 
COMMIT and COUNTER) are associated with higher income, lower income variability, and 
fewer nonperfomzing loans, charge-offs, and failures.  Note that this does not imply that risk 
is lowered by commitments, ceteris paribus, but rather that commitments are a signal of 
quality because better performing banks tend to issue more commitments. Interestingly, this 
better performance result also holds for other counterparty off-balance sheet items standards 
(primarily standby letters of credit), but only for large banks.  For the small bank sample, 
these items appear to be positively associated with risk, although the RBC  risk weight still 
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appears to be too large.  Third, assets in the 20 percent risk category appear to be weighted 
too lightly. This is particularly noticeable in the INCOMESTD and FAILURE regressions, 
19 
and may reflect interest rate risk.  Fourth, loans in the 100  percent category appear to have 
about the right relative weight, although part of this is by statistical construction, since 
RWAl00 comprises more than 70 percent of RWA.  Of the two separate components of this 
category examined, C&I  loans appear to be consistently associated with somewhat poorer 
performance than indicated by their 100  percent weight and may be weighted too lightly, 
while consumer loans have mixed results.  Finally, the market risk off-balance sheet activities 
(MKTFUSK) generally have very large relative coefficients that indicate better rather than 
worse bank performance, perhaps as a result of their use in hedging interest rate risk 
18. The COUNTER  results are generally consistent with those of Benveniste and Berger (1986,1987), who found 
that the quaotity of standby letters of credit issued was negatively related to bank risk for banks that participated 
in the standby market. 
19. Explicit account of interest rate risk is under coosideration for future versions of RBC. 
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coefficients for the large banks are mainly statistically insignificant  and 2) the coefficients for 
the small banks may be overly influenced by  a few observations, since the vast majority of 
small banks have little or no contracts of this type  (see Table 2). 
No inferences about the appropriateness of the zero percent risk category (primarily cash 
and government securities) can be made from the regressions in Table 3, because these regres- 
sions test relative rather than absolute weights. A separate set of regressions (not displayed) 
was run to test the zero restriction. These regressions were similar to those in Table 3, except 
that the zero category was added and levels of the variables were used rather than ratios (ratios 
would create perfect collinearity). In general, the results support the zero restriction.  Indeed, 
in all but 2 of 10 cases, negative weights for the zero percent category could be indicated be- 
cause higher levels of zero category assets were associated with better bank performance. The 
two exceptions (large bank income and failure) were statistically insignificant. 
Table 4 presents results indicating the informational value revealed when banks fail to 
meet various capital standards. The first set of regressions shows the effects on predicted 
bank performance of failing to meet any combination of the new and the old capital standards 
relative to passing both standards (the omitted category). The effect for banks failing both 
standards is given by the coefficients of OLD plus NEW;  those failing only the new standards 
by NEW  plus NEWONLY; and those failing only the old standards by OLD.  As measured 
by INCOME, INCOMESTD, and FAILURE, the results consistently show that banks that 
would have failed both standards have poorer predicted performance in the following year 
relative to banks that failed only one or neither standard. Moreover, of the banks that failed 
only one standard, failure of the new standards appears to be a much better predictor of 
poor future performance. Interestingly, the results become much stronger in favor of the 
predictive power of the new standards in the NONPERFORM and CHARGEOFF regres- 
sions. Here, banks failing the new standard but not the old one show poorer or the same 
performance as those failing both standards. These are likely to be banks with very large loan 
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average loan problems in the future. 
The second set of regressions presented in Table 4 sheds light on the relative predictive 
power of the three requirements of the new standard: Tier 1, total capital, and leverage. The 
data generally show that failing any of the three requirements indicates poorer performance. 
Of the 30 coefficients of FAILTI, FAILTOT, and FAILLEV, 28 are of the expected sign, 
although many of the coefficients are not statistically significant  because of the strong col- 
linearity.2  Turning to specifics, the data show that failing the Tier 1 standard predicts more 
pronounced future performance problems than failing the leverage requirement. The data 
also suggest that banks that fail the total capital standard but pass the Tier 1 standard are 
likely to perform better than those failing both standards and worse than those passing both 
standards. This is particularly true for small banks.  Thus, the inclusion of Tier 2 capital in 
the RBC requirements appears to add important infomation. 
The SHORTFALL variable, which measures the degree to which capital standards are 
violated, is included in order to fom  a crude test of  "prompt resolution."  Under prompt 
resolution policies, successively greater penalties (including closure) are applied to banks as 
they fall further below capital minimums. The data lend strong support to prompt resolution, 
with all 10 SHORTFALL coefficients indicating poorer future perfomance the greater is the 
degree to which the standards are violated (9 are statistically significant).  The EXCESS vari- 
able, which measures the degree to which the capital standards are exceeded, provides a 
crude test of whether it may be appropriate to reward banks for holding capital beyond the 
minimum requirements through a reduced RBDI premium or other method.  The results 
20. Note that all tbe  regressions reported in Table 4 include tbe  risk category and subcategory variables. Although 
tbese coefficients are not shown, they are consistent with those shown in Table 3, indicating robustness of the rela- 
tive risk weight dts. 
21. Recall that by wmtructiorr, banks that fail tbe  Tier 1 standard (FA.LTl=l)  also fail the total standard 
(FAILTOT=l). Banks that fail the Tier 1 standard also very oft*  fail the leverage requirement (FAlLLEV=l), since 
&y  are  based on tbe  same capital definition (see section V). 
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cients of EXCESS mostly predict poorer performance. 
The relative predictive power of the capital standards is further illustrated by the raw 
data duplayed in Table 5, which show the correspondence between failing the capital stan- 
dards and the most important performance variable, FAILURE, over the two-year period in 
which the most bank failures occurred. More than 40 percent of the banks that failed both the 
old and new standards at the end of  1987 were bankrupt by the end of  1989. Banks that 
failed only one of the two standards were significantly less likely than those failing both stan- 
dards to go bankrupt in the following two years, although failing the new standards was the 
better predictor of the two.  The bottom half of the table shows that of  all the banks that failed 
one or more parts of the new capital standards, 32.3 percent went bankrupt over the next two 
years, as opposed to only 1.1 percent bankruptcies for those that passed all the new require- 
ments. While all three portions of the new standards had some considerable predictive 
ability, the Tier 1  standard was overwhelming--more than 50 percent of the banks that failed 
this standard at the end of  1987 were bankrupt within two years. 
Results presented in this section are quite robust to a number of variations that are not 
displayed. These include dropping the risk subcategories from the regressions in Tables 3 
and 4, varying the time periods, adding dummies for size classes, adding independent vari- 
ables lagged two years, and adjusting the performance measures in various ways, such as 
making the FAILURE  variable cover one year instead of two.  In no case did these variations 
substantively alter the basic conclusions. 
V.  The Strin~ency  of the Risk-Based Capital Standards 
Whether the new RBC standards are likely to be effective in changing bank behavior 
depends both upon the implicit relative capital prices that they impose (analyzed in the pre- 
vious section), and upon the extent to which the new standards are more or less stringent than 
the old standards on individual banks (i.e., the change in absolute capital prices). To examine 
the stringency question, we apply both the 1992 RBC standards and the old standards to all 
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binding on different size classes of banks as compared to the old standards and examine the 
effects of tightening the new standards. We also look at which characteristics of the new 
standards are most important in making them binding. Finally, we examine which balance 
sheet and off-balance sheet activities account for the greatest burdens in terms of risk- 
weighted assets and calculate the effects of some changes in portfolio behavior. 
Table 6 shows the banks that fail to meet the new and old capital standards and each of 
the three components of the new standards, based on 1989 data.  For a given size class of 
banks, each cell shows the proportion of banks that fail to meet the standards, the percent of 
the size class' assets represented by these banks, and the gross amount of capital by which 
these banks are deficient. 
Comparison of the new and old standards in columns (I), (2), and (3) yields two major 
conclusions. First, the new standards will put pressure on a significantly  different set of banks 
than the old standards, shifting the burden of capital requirements substantially onto larger 
banks.  Institutions that failed the RBC standards in 1989 comprised 27.7 percent of all bank 
assets and were nearly eight times as large as those that passed, with nearly half of the banks 
in the largest size class (more than $10 billion in assets) failing.  By contrast, banks that failed 
the old standards comprised only 3.6 percent of all assets and were slightly smaller on average 
than those that passed. The contrast between the new and old standards with respect to bank 
size is also highlighted by the data shown in column (3), which shows the banks that failed the 
new standards but passed the old ones.  Of the banks that failed the new standards, almost 40 
percent passed the old standards, and these institutions accounted for nearly 90 percent of all 
the assets of banks failing the new standards. The remaining 125 banks that failed the old 
standards and passed the new ones (not shown) were very small, accounting for only 0.4 per- 
cent of all bank assets. A major reason for this size differential is that the larger banks had a 
much higher proportion of their portfolios in off-balance sheet activities, which did not have 
explicit capital requirements under the old standards. 
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the old ones.  Five hundred ninety-one banks failed the new standards, 22 percent more than 
the 484 that failed the old standards. In addition, the capital deficiency under the new stan- 
dards was $15.1 billion, more than six times the $2.4 billion under the old standards. Despite 
these relatively large differences, however, it is not clear whether in the aggregate the new 
standards will be very difficult  to meet. The $15.1 billion aggregate capital deficit represents 
only 6 percent of the $256 billion of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital held by the industry in 1989. For 
banks in the largest size class, which accounted for $10.8 billion of the total deficiency, this 
represents 11 percent of their $96 billion in capital.  Note that the costs of compliance will be 
somewhat lower than the costs of raising these amounts of capital because of the flexibility of 
the RBC standards.  In some cases, the cost of making portfolio adjustments to reduce required 
capital--such as substituting lower risk category assets for higher risk category assets, selling 
assets, or reducing off-balance sheet activities--will be less than the cost of raising additional 
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capital. 
Columns (4), (5), and (6) show the banks that failed to meet the three components of 
the new RBC requirements: Tier 1, total capital, and leverage. The total standard is clearly 
more binding than the Tier 1 standard, with 585 banks (representing 27.7 percent of  all bank 
assets) having failed the total standard and only 259 banks (representing 5.2 percent of all 
bank assets) having failed the Tier 1 standard. Part of this dominance of the total standard is 
by construction, since banks that fail the Tier 1 standard must also fail the total standard. 
However, much of this result is also due to the fact that the old standards placed very little 
emphasis on the types of capital in Tier 2.  In 1989, total Tier 1 capital was $200 billion, 
while Tier 2 was only $56 billion. Moreover, $30 billion of the $56 billion in Tier 2 capital 
was loan loss reserves, which counted as primary capital under the old standards. 
22. Note also tbat  because of some of tbe RBC  capital restrictions, the  capital deficiency is not always the amount 
that must be raised to meet tbe  standards.  For instance, if a bank is bound by the restriction that Tier 2 be no 
greater than Tier 1, a marginal $1 raised of Tier 1 capital reduces the  capital deficiency by $2, and a marginal $1 
raised of Tier 2 capital leaves tbe capital deficiency unchanged. 
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at least 3 percent of their unweighted total assets.  This requirement appears to be very similar 
to the Tier 1 requirement, which requires the same type of capital. The main difference is 
that the leverage requirement falls less hard on the largest banks, since it neglects off-balance 
sheet items.  However, the noteworthy fact is that the leverage requirement as applied here 
adds virtually nothing to the risk-based requirements.  Only six small banks failed the 
leverage requirement that did not fail the risk-based requirements, making column (5) nearly 
identical to column (1). 
Much discussion has focused on the levels of the Tier 1 and total capital requirements. 
Table 7 shows the effects of raising these standards on the various size classes of banks. 
Column (1) shows the new standards applied to 1989 data, and the succeeding columns report 
the effects  of increasing the Tier 1 and total standards by  1,2,3,  and 4 percent.  Column (2) 
shows that increasing the standards to 5 percent for Tier 1 and to 9 percent for total capital 
virtually doubles the number of banks that would have failed to meet the standards for all size 
classes except the largest one and the smallest two.  However, the aggregate total capital 
deficit rises only to $26 billion, or about 10 percent of  1989 capital.  As the capital require- 
ments increase toward the 811 2 standard shown in column (5), the increase in failures to meet 
the standards is relatively uniform, except for the largest size class. Nearly all of the largest 
banks would have failed by the 6/10 standard. The most interesting result is how many of the 
small and even moderate-sized banks had sufficient capital to pass the 8/12 standard. Given 
that capital standards have never been near that range, it is surprising that more than half of 
the banks in each size class up to $500 million would have passed this high standard. One 
reason for this result is that many of these smaller banks held capital in excess of the old stan- 
dards and had relatively low risk-weighted assets, since they had little or no off-balance sheet 
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dards is substantial, 32,  percent of 1989 capital. Most of this deficiency is in the largest size 
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class, which had a shortfall of $52 billion, or 54 percent of its capital. 
We next examine the effects of what may be considered to be the four key innovations 
of the new RBC standards: 1) giving unequal weights to different asset categories, 2) includ- 
ing off-balance sheet activities in risk-weighted assets, 3) increasing the total amount of 
capital required, and 4) changing the treatment of loan loss reserves in the capital categories. 
We examine the influences of these innovations by "undoing" them one at a time, leaving all 
other aspects of the RBC standards unchanged.  The top of Table 8 gives the figures for 1989 
compliance with the new capital standards by  all banks and also by banks in the largest size 
class.  Row (1) in Panel A shows how many of the 1989 banks would have failed the RBC 
standards if all assets were given equal weights in risk-weighted assets; row (2) indicates the 
failure rate if off-balance sheet activities were excluded from the standards; row (3) shows 
the figures if the total amount of capital required were the same as under the old standards; 
and row (4) notes the results if loan loss reserves were counted as Tier 1  capital (instead of 
Tier 2) and were not restricted to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. Note that for rows (1) 
and (2), where specific weights are changed, the weights are adjusted so that the required 
capital for the banking system as a whole remains unchanged.  Thus, in row (I), the common 
capital weight applied to all assets is such that total systemwide assets require the same capi- 
tal in 1989 as under RBC. In row (2), when off~balance  sheet items are weighted at zero, the 
weights on all on-balance sheet assets are adjusted upward proportionately so that system- 
wide required capital is held constant. 
The results in row (1) indicate that weighting the on-balance sheet assets equally instead 
of applying the RBC relative risk weights has little effect on the number of banks that would 
have failed the standards, increasing the total  from 591 to 597. However, there is a decrease in 
23. The  effects of increasing the leverage requirement from 3 to 6 percent were also calculated. A 6 percent lever- 
age requirement would more than  double the 1989 failures to meet the new standards, to 1,639 banks representing 56 
percent of assets, including 37 of the  47 banks in the largest siw class. This suggests that a high leverage re- 
quirement may have a dominating effect, even while tbe 3 percent requirement had virtually no effect. 
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have relatively high proportions of their on-balance sheet assets in the 100 percent category. 
The effect of excluding off-balance sheet activities from the standards (row 2) would have in- 
creased the total number failing the standards from 591 to 915, while decreasing large bank 
failures from 20 to 12. This  occurs primarily because off-balance sheet requirements shift a 
sigmficant  part of the total capital burden (held constant in the calculation) from the great num- 
ber of smaller banks onto the relatively few large banks that dominate off-balance sheet 
markets. 
The increase in total quantity of capital required under the new standards (row 3) is also 
important--only 48 1 banks would have failed the new standards had the aggregate required 
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capital been kept at the level of the old standards.  The effect of increased capital would 
have been much greater still had policy makers not shifted real estate loans from the 100 per- 
cent to the 50 percent category (without a corresponding change in the capital ratios): A 
calculation with real estate loans at 100  percent (not shown) would have increased the num- 
ber of banks failing the standards to 875. Finally, allowing loan loss reserves to count fully 
in Tier 1 capital instead of restricting it in Tier 2 (row 4) would have decreased the number of 
banks failing the standards from 591 to 416, with a more than proportionate decrease for the 
largest banks from 20 to 11. Additional calculations (not shown) indicate that virtually all of 
this effect is from the 1.25 percent restriction on reserves counting as capital, as opposed to 
counting them as Tier 2 instead of Tier 1. Note that these restrictions on including loan loss 
reserves in required capital are the only way in which RBC takes account of the current per- 
2 5  formance of the bank's portfolio, as opposed to the types of activities within the portfolio. 
24. The increase in required total capital is equivalent to about .4 percent of assets, hm  6.0 to 6.4 percent, 
since the ratio of total risk-weighted assets to unweighted assets is .8 and the new capital standards require 8 
percent total capital in place of 6 percent. 
25. Berger, Kuester, and O'Brien (1990) showed that if loan loss reserves were based more closely on portfolio per- 
formance measures (past due, mgotiated, and  nonaccrual loans), the  distribution of banks that fail the  new 
standards would be substantially altered. 
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portfolios made as a result of RBC  in order to determine how successfd such changes may be 
in meeting the standards without actually raising any capital. Row (5) shows the effect on 
compliance with the RBC  standards of eliminating 10 percent of the assets in the 100 percent 
category.  Banks could accomplish this by  selling off loans or other assets in the 100 percent 
category, by  substituting some lower risk category assets for higher risk category assets, or by 
making adjustments to some assets (e.g., securing more loans with 1-4 family residences). 
Row (6) shows the effect of eliminating half of all loan commitments with maturities of more 
than one year and half of all standbys issued to nonfinancial fm. These off-balance sheet 
changes approximate the effects of shifting half of  all long-term commitments and all 
standbys backing commercial paper to commitments of one year or less (which have a zero 
weight).  Row (7) combines these on- and off-balance sheet changes. The results suggest that 
quite a few banks may be able to meet the RBC  standards in large part or in full by  making 
on-balance sheet portfolio changes, but that the potential for meeting the standards by  off- 
balance sheet adjustments is more limited, except for the largest banks. 
VI.  Conclusion 
This  paper uses historical data on the relationship between bank performance and 
portfolio behavior to analyze the new risk-based capital program.  We test the RBC  relative 
risk weights by regressing several measures of bank performance, including bankruptcy, on 
the proportions of bank portfolios in each of the risk categories one year prior, using data 
from 1982 to 1989. The data strongly suggest that the'relative risk weights constitute an irn- 
provement over the old capital standards of equal weights for all assets. In all cases, banks 
with higher ratios of risk-weighted assets to unweighted assets have poorer predicted per- 
formance, and most of these results are statistically significant.  However, we also find 
several instances in which the risk weights for specific categories appear to be out of line 
with the performance results.  An implication of these findings is that a risk-based deposit 
insurance scheme that uses the same portfolio risk-weights as the new RBC  program (plus 
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current flat-rate deposit insurance scheme, although there may be room for even further im- 
provement by altering some of the risk weights and possibly including measures of bank 
performance. 
Similar tests of the informational value of different capital standards suggest that both 
the new and old capital standards have independent information in predicting future bank per- 
formance problems, but that the new standards have more information. The data also indicate 
that there may be independent information in each of the Tier 1  and total capital components 
of the new standards. The leverage requirement as it is applied here adds virtually no new 
information, since almost every bank that fails it also fails one of the other RBC require- 
ments. The degree to which banks fail the new standards is found to be a good predictor of 
future performance problems, lending support to **prompt  resolution" policies to take action 
against banks based on the degree to which the standards are violated.  Su'prisingly, the de- 
gree to which banks exceed the standards is not found to predict better future performance. 
Examination of the stringency  'of the new RBC standards shows that they fall much 
more heavily on large banks than do the old standards, with the banks that fail the new stan- 
dards representing more than one-fourth of all banking industry assets. This occurs because 
large banks have higher proportions of their portfolios in highly capitalized items, particularly 
off-balance sheet activities. The RBC standards are also more stringent than the old stan- 
dards in absolute terms, with more banks failing the new standards, and failing them with a 
much larger capital deficiency. Nonetheless, the new standards still require only a small in- 
crease in capital relative to the current stock. Of the major innovations of RBC, only the 
more conservative treatment of loan loss reserves as capital and the overall increase in capital 
required raised the aggregate stringency of the standards significantly. Calculations of 
portfolio reactions to RBC suggest that many banks may be able to meet the new standards in 
part or in full by adjusting their asset holdings, but that there is limited scope for using off- 
balance sheet adjustments to meet the standards. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIt must be cautioned that because the results reported here axe  based on historical as- 
sociations, care must be taken in extrapolating any conclusions about future bank 
performance and behavior.  Once the RBC regulations are fully in place, banks will be react- 
ing to different relative and absolute prices than those embodied in our data set, and this 
could change the results significantly. Nonetheless, we believe that our basic fmdings about 
the appropriateness of the RBC  relative risk weights, the informational content of the new 
and old standards, and the shifts in the stringency of the standards are sufficiently conclusive 
to hold up over time. 
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8-Y  OF  TEE NEW  RISK-BASED  CAPITAL  STANDARDS 
RISK  CATEGORIES 
Category Al  (0 percent weight) 
Cash,  Federal Reserve Bank  balances 
Securities of  the U.S.  Treasury,  OECD  governments,  and some  U.S.  agencies 
Category  A2  (20 percent weight) 
Cash items  in the process of  collection 
U.S.  and OECD  interbank deposits and guaranteed claims 
Some  non-OECD  bank  and government  deposits and securities 
General obligation municipal bonds 
Some  mortgage-backed  securities 
Claims  collateralized by  the U.S.  Treasury and some  other government  securities 
Category A3  (50 percent weight) 
Loans  fully secured by  first liens on  1-4  family residential properties 
Other  (revenue) municipal bonds 
Category A4  (100 percent weight) 
All other on-balance  sheet assets not  listed above,  including: 
loans to  private entities and individuals,  some  claims on  non-OECD 
governments and banks,  real assets,  and investments  in subsidiaries 
Category 81  (off-balance sheet counterparty guarantees;  weights  in parentheses) 
Direct-credit-substitute  standby letters of  credit  (mainly  100 percent) 
Performance-related  standby letters of  credit  (mainly 50  percent) 
Unused  portion of  loan commitments with original maturity of  more  than 
one year  (mainly 50  percent) 
Other  loan commitments  (0 percent) 
Commercial  letters of  credit  (20 percent) 
Bankers  acceptances conveyed  (20 percent) 
Category B2  (off-balance  sheet market  risk contracts;  weights  in parentheses) 
Interest rate swaps,  forward commitments to  purchase foreign exchange 
and other items  (between 0 and 5 percent  of  the notional value, 
plus the mark-to-market  value of  the contract,  capped at 50  percent) 
CAPITAL  REQUIREMENTS 
Tier 1 
Common  equity,  some preferred stock,  minority interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries less goodwill. 
Tier 1 capital must  be  at least 4  percent of  risk-weighted  assets. 
Tier 2 
Loan  loss reserve  (limited to  1.25 percent of  risk-weighted  assets), 
subordinated debt  (limited to  50  percent  of  Tier l),  and other preferred 
and convertible stock. 
Tier 2 capital cannot be larger than Tier 1 capital. 
Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital must  be at least 8  percent of  risk-weighted 
assets. 
Leverage Requirawmt 
Tier 1 capital must  be at least 3 percent of  total on-balance  sheet assets 
(will be  higher  for banks  with poor  examination ratings and for those not 
meeting certain conditions,  a  fact not incorporated here;  see text,  fn.  11). 
Source:  Federal Reserve press releases. 
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Small  Large 
Bank  Banks 
a  Ratio of  net income  to total adjusted assets.  ,0043  .0069 
When  failure occurs,  INCOME  is estimated as the 
negative of  capital in period t minus  the FDIC's 
estimated outlay. 
Sample  standard deviation of  INCOME  for each bank.  ,0135  .0110 
Ratio of  nonperforming  loans  (past due and 
nonaccruing)  to adjusted assets. 
Ratio of  net loan charge-offs  to adjusted assets.  ,0059  ,0058 
Dummy,  equals one  if the bank  fails within 2 years  .0192  .0171 
hence.  The  December  1988 observation  includes 
failures only through March  1990. 
0.2  times ratio of  20  percent weight  on-balance  .0352  ,0361 
sheet assets to  adjusted assets. 
0.5 times ratio of  50  percent weight  on-balance  .0801  .0762 
sheet assets to adjusted assets. 
1.0 times ratio of  100 percent weight  on-balance  ,4734  ,5323 
sheet assets to adjusted assets. 
Ratio of  counterparty off-balance  sheet assets  .0086  .0342 
(appropriately weighted)  to adjusted assets. 
Ratio of  market  risk off-balance  sheet assets  .0000003  .00005 
(appropriately weighted)  to adjusted assets. 
Ratio of  total risk-weighted  assets to adjusted  .5972  .6788 
assets. 
RISK-WEICBTH) ASSET  SUBCATEGORIES 
0.5  times ratio of  1-4  family real estate loans to  .0556  .0513 
adjusted assets. 
1.0 times ratio of  commercial  and industrial loans  .0453  ,1682 
to adjusted assets. 
1.0 times ratio of  consumer  loans to adjusted assets.  .I167  .I392 
Ratio of  loan commitments  (adjusted by  their risk-  .0054  .0237 
weighted  asset weights) to adjusted assets. 
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Table 2  (continued) 
Definition 
Sample Means 
Small  Large 
Bank8  Bank8  - - 
NEW  AND Om CAPITAL  STANDARD  FAILURE  DUMIlGS 
NEW  Dummy,  equals one  for failing any portion of  the 
new  capital standard. 
Om  Dummy,  equals one  for failing either the primary  or 
the total capital portion of  the old standard. 
NEWONLY  Dummy,  equals one  for failing any portion of  the 
new  standard and passing the old standard. 
NEW  CAPITAL  STANDARD  FAILURE  -0NENTS 
FAILTl  Dummy,  equals one  for failing Tier 1 standard. 
FAILTOT  Dummy,  equals one  for failing total standard. 
FAILLEV  Dummy,  equals one  for failing leverage standard. 
SHORTFALL  Ratio of  capital shortfall  (maximum  of  capital 
deficiency in meeting leverage or total standards) 
to  adjusted assets.  Zero  if the bank  does not  fail 
either part of  the standards. 
EXCESS  Ratio of  excess capital (the minimum  overage  of  the 
leverage and total standards) to adjusted assets. 
a. Total adjusted assets are total assets plus loan  loss reserves. 
b.  A  number  of  assumptions had  to be  made  to construct historically consistent 
series for these variables,  since they do  not  correspond exactly to Call Report 
categories.  Details of  these calculations are available from the authors. 
c. For  1982,  the only off-balance  sheet  item available was  standby letters of 
credit.  For  COUNTER,  this essentially means  that loan commitments  (the only 
other substantial element  of  COUNTER)  was  missing for this year.  A  zero was 
included for this year  for MKTRISK,  which  was  zero for most  of  the banks  and 
substantial for only a few. 
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Parameter t-stat  Parameter t-stat  Parameter t-stat  Parameter t-stat  Parameter t-stat 
Sources:  Federal  Resenre  Reports  of Condition and  Income,  FDIC  press releases. 
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Not  shown,  but also included in all  of these regressions are all  of  the variables shown  in Table 3  (intercept, 
time dummies,  RWA20,  RWA50,  RWAl00,  COUNTER,  MKTRISK,  REALEST,  CLI,  CONSUMER,  and COMMIT) . 
Sourcea:  Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income,  FDIC  press releases. 
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BXM  B'AIIDRES  TO  MEET  VARIOUS  CAPITAL  STANDARDS 
(December  19  8  7  ) 
Banks  That  Pass or Fail  Percentage of  Percentage That Were  Bankrupt 
Various Capital Standards  1987 Banks  by  the End  of  1989 
mARISONS W  NEW AND  OLD  CAPITAL  STANDARDS 
Fail new  and old standards  3.6% 
Fail new,  pass old  2.4% 
Fail old,  pass new  1.2% 
Pass both standards  92.8% 
mAR1sms  W  PORTIONS  OF  TEE  NEW  STANDARDS 
Fail Tier 1,  total,  or leverage  6.0% 
Fail Tier 1  2.7% 
Fail total, pass Tier 1  3.2% 
Fail only leverage  0.1% 
Pass all  portions  94.0% 
Sources:  Federal Reserve Reports of  Condition and Income,  FDIC  press releases. 
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BANKS  TEAT FAIL TO n&ET VARIOUS CAPITAL STANDARDS 
(December  1989) 
Number Failing Capital Standards/Total Number of Banks in the Class 
Percent of Total Assets Held by Banks Failing the Standards 
Total Capital Deficiency ($ millions) 
Asset Size  (1  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Class  Fail New  Fail Old  Fail New  Fail  Fail  Fail 
($ millions)  Pass Old  Tier 1  Total  Leverage 
>lo,  000  20/47  3/47  17/47  6/47  20/47  4/47 
53.3%  5.2%  48.2%  9.6%  53.3%  6.8% 
$10,816  $973  $9,671  $1,717  $10,816  $7,181  ____  ........................................................................... 
All Banks  591/12,623  484/12,623  232/12,623  259/12,623  585/12,623  273/12,623 
27.7%  3.6%  24.5%  5.2%  27.7%  3.9% 
$15,058  $2,357  $11,742  $3,587  $15,056  $2,524 
Note:  The 1992 risk-based capital standards are applied to December 1989 Call Report data. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income, FDIC press releases. 
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BANKS  TEAT WODLD PAIL TO MEET INCREASED RISK-BASED CAPITAL STANDARDS 
(December  1989) 
Number  Failing Capital Standards/Total  Number  of  Banks  in  the Class 
Percent of Total Assets  Held by Banks  Failing the Standards 
Total Capital Deficiency  ($ millions) 
Asset Size  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Class  4% Tier 1  5%  Tier 1  6% Tier 1  7% Tier 1  8% Tier 1 
($ millions)  8%  Total  9% Total  10%  Total  11%  Total  12%  Total 
-  -  ---  ---- ----  - -  -  -- ..................... 
All  Banks  591/12,623  982/12, 623  1606/12,623  2408/12, 623  3332/12,623 
27.7%  41.8%  63.3%  71.4%  77.9% 
$15, 058  $25,509  $41,508  $61, 246  $82,838 
Note:  The  1992 risk-based  capital standards are applied to  December  1989 Call Report 
data. 
Sources:  Federal Reserve  Reports of  Condition and  Income,  FDIC  press releases. 
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EFFECTS  OF  THE  -VAL  OF  KEY ASPECTS  OF  RISK-BASED  CAPITAL 
AND  BANK  PORTFOLIO  REACTIONS  TO  RISK-BASED  CAPITAL 
(December 1989) 
Number  Failing Capital Standards/Total  Number  of  Banks  in  the Class 
Percent of Total Assets Held by  Banks  Failing the Standards 
Total Capital Deficiency  ($ millions) 
Calculation  All  Assets > 
Banks  $10  Billion 
Complete  1992 RBC  standards 
applied to 1989 portfolios 
A.  Removal of  Key  Aspects  of  Risk-Based  Capital 
1. Removal  of unequal weighting 
of on-balance  sheet assets 
2.  Removal  of  off-balance  sheet 
activities 
3.  Removal  of increase in capital  481/12,623 
required over old standards  23.4% 
$11,347 
4.  Removal  of new  treatment of loan  416/12,623 
loss reserves in  capital categories  16.5% 
$7,290 
-  - 
B.  Potential Portfolio Reactions  to Risk-Based  Capital 
5. On-balance  sheet adjustments  (elim-  437/12,623 
inating 10%  of the 100 percent risk  21.4% 
category assets)  $10, 606 
6.  Off -balance  sheet adjustments  (elim-  544/12,623 
inating 50% of  loan codtments and  22.4% 
50% of  standbys to nonfinancial  firms)  $10,582 
7.  On-  and off-balance  sheet 
adjustments combined 
Note:  The  1992 risk-based  capital standards are applied to  December  1989 Call 
Report  data. 
Sources:  Federal Reserve Reports of  Condition and Income,  FDIC  press releases. 
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